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A superb multi-media database for information on World War 2.
Sino-Japanese War 1894 - 1895 (a summary)
War fought between China and Japan from 1894 to 1895.
Provoked by a dispute over control of Korea, the Sino-Japanese War came
to symbolize the degeneration and enfeeblement of the Qing dynasty. It
demonstrated how successful modernization had been in Japan since the
Meiji Restoration as compared with that in China. Japan feared Russian
expansion into northern China and Korea, and sought foreign conquests
in line with nationalistic Meiji ideology. Yi dynasty Korea sought to
preserve its traditional seclusion and tributary relationship with
China, which in turn strove to protect its principal vassal.
Since 1875 China had allowed Japan to recognize
Korea as an independent state. Then, as China tried to reassert
influence over its former tributary, this provoked rivalry with Japan
and a split in Korean public opinion between modernizing reformists and
inward-looking conservatives. In 1894 a pro-Japanese Korean reformist
was assassinated in Shanghai and a Korean religious sect, the Tonghak,
began a rebellion. The Korean government appealed to China for
assistance and the Japanese encouraged Chinese intervention, only to
send an expedition ostensibly in support of Korean reformists, reaching
Seoul by June 8 and seizing the royal palace a fortnight later.
War was officially declared on August 1, 1894,
although land and naval fighting had begun before that. The Japanese
army defeated the Chinese in a series of battles around Seoul and
Pyóngyang, forcing them to retreat north. Further victories in Liaoning
opened the way to China proper, and by November 21 the Japanese had
taken Port Arthur (modern Luda).
China's northern fleet was mauled by the Japanese
navy off the mouth of the Yalu River, losing 8 out of 12 warships,
retreated behind the fortifications of the Weihaiwei naval base, and
was then caught by a surprise Japanese land attack across the Liaodong
Peninsula which shattered the ships in harbour with shelling from the
landward side. After Weihaiwei's fall on February 2 and an easing in
harsh winter conditions, Japanese troops pressed their advance into
Manchuria.
The Chinese were forced to sue for peace and sign
the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895. Though nominally recognized as
a sovereign state, Korea effectively became a Japanese protectorate,
and China had to cede Taiwan, the Liaodong Peninsula, and the
Pescadores to Japan "in perpetuity". In addition, China had to pay a
war indemnity of 200 million taels, and open four more treaty ports to
external trade. In the so-called Triple Intervention, Russia, France,
and Germany forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula, but China
was obliged to pay a further 30 million taels.
This outcome enraged Chinese students and
intensified pressure for more radical modernization. Shortly afterwards
Sun Yat-sen founded the revolutionary republican movement which later
became the Kuomintang. The war also encouraged further Japanese
encroachments on Chinese territory.
Watch The Battle of the Yalu River, a Chinese
movie about the Sino-Japanese War with English subtitles
First Sino-Japanese War
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First Sino-Japanese War |
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Direct results of the war
showed that the military strength and sovereignty of the Qing Dynasty
had been severely weakened during the nineteenth century, especially by
the Opium Wars; and it demonstrated that forced reform had modernized Japan significantly since the Meiji Restoration in 1867, especially as compared with the Self-Strengthening Movement
in China.[1] Regional
dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; and the Qing
Dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major
blow. These trends would later manifest in the 1911 Revolution.
Background and causes
After two centuries, the Japanese Sakoku seclusion policy under the shoguns of the Edo period came to an end when the country was forced open to trade by American intervention in 1854. The years following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the fall of the Shogunate had seen Japan transform itself from a feudal society to a modern industrial state. The
Japanese had sent delegations and students around the world in order to
learn and assimilate western arts and sciences; this was done not only
to prevent Japan from falling under foreign domination but to enable
Japan to compete equally with the Western powers.[2]
Conflict over Korea
Satirical drawing in Punch Magazine[3] (29 September 1894), showing the victory of "small" Japan over "large" China.
As a newly-emergent power Japan turned its attention toward Korea. In
order to protect its own interests and security, Japan wanted to either
annex Korea before it was seized by another power, or at least ensure
Korea's effective independence by developing its resources and
reforming its administration. As Prussian advisor Major Klemens Meckel put it to the Meiji army, Korea was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan". Japan
felt that another power having a military presence on the Korean
peninsula would have been detrimental to Japanese national security,
and so Japan resolved to end the centuries-old Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Moreover, Japan realized that having access to Korea’s coal and iron ore deposits would benefit Japan's growing industrial base.
On February 27, 1876,
after certain incidents and confrontations involving Korean
isolationists and the Japanese, Japan imposed the Treaty of Ganghwa
on Korea; forcing Korea to open itself to Japanese and foreign trade
and to proclaim its independence from China in its foreign relations.
Korea had traditionally been a tributary state and continued to be so under the influence of China's Qing dynasty, which exerted large influence over the conservative Korean officials gathered around the royal family of the Joseon Dynasty. Opinion
in Korea itself was split; conservatives wanted to retain the
traditional subservient relationship with China, while reformists
wanted to establish closer ties with Japan and western nations. After two Opium Wars against the British Empire and the Sino-French War, China had become weak and was unable to resist political intervention and territorial encroachment by western powers (see Unequal Treaties). Japan saw this as an opportunity to replace Chinese influence in Korea with its own.
1882 Crisis
The flight of the Japanese Legation in 1882.
In 1882 the Korean
peninsula experienced a severe drought which led to food shortages,
causing much hardship and discord among the population. Korea was on the verge of bankruptcy; the government was not able to pay its debts, particularly to its military. There was deep resentment amongst the soldiers of the Korean army who had not been paid for months. On July 23 a military mutiny and riot broke out in Seoul; troops, assisted by the population, sacked the rice granaries there. The next morning the royal palace and barracks were attacked. The crowd then turned on the Japanese legation. The Japanese
legation staff managed to escape to Chemulpo and then Nagasaki via the British survey ship Flying Fish.
In response the Japanese
sent four warships and a battalion of troops to Seoul to safeguard
Japanese interests and demand reparations. The Chinese also deployed 4,500 troops to counter the Japanese. Tensions subsided, however, with the Treaty of Chemulpo which was signed on the evening of August 30, 1882. The agreement specified that the conspirators involved would be punished and 50,000 yen would be paid to the families of the Japanese killed. The Japanese government would also receive 500,000 yen, a formal apology, and
permission to construct barracks and station troops at their diplomatic legation in Seoul.
Gapsin Coup
In 1884 a group of pro-Japanese reformers briefly overthrew the pro-Chinese conservative Korean government in a bloody coup d'état. However, the pro-Chinese faction, with assistance from Chinese troops under General Yuan Shikai, succeeded in regaining control with an equally bloody counter-coup. This
second coup resulted not only with the deaths of a number of the
reformers, but also in the burning of the Japanese legation and the
deaths of several legation guards and citizens in the process. This caused an incident between Japan and China, but
was eventually settled by the Sino-Japanese Convention of Tientsin
of 1885 in which the two sides agreed to (a) pull their expeditionary
forces out of Korea simultaneously; (b) not send military instructors
for the training of the Korean military; and (c) notify the other side
beforehand should one decide to send troops to Korea. The Japanese, however, were frustrated by repeated Chinese attempts to undermine their influence in Korea.
Kim Ok-kyun Affair
In March 28, 1894, a pro-Japanese Korean revolutionary, Kim Ok-kyun, was assassinated in Shanghai. Kim had fled to Japan after his involvement the 1884 coup; the Japanese had turned down Korean demands that he be extradited. He was lured to Shanghai where he was killed in a Japanese inn in the international settlement. His
body was then taken aboard a Chinese warship and sent back to Korea,
where it was quartered and displayed as a warning to other rebels. The Japanese government took this as a direct affront, and a setback for
Japan's stature and dignity.[4]
The situation became increasingly tense later in the year when the Chinese government, at the request of the Korean emperor, sent troops to aid in suppressing the Tonghak Rebellion. The
Chinese government informed the Japanese government of its decision to
send troops to the Korean peninsula in accordance with the Convention of Tientsin, and sent General Yuan Shikai as its plenipotentiary at the head of 2,800 troops. The
Japanese countered that they considered this action to be a violation
of the convention, and sent their own expeditionary force (the Oshima
Composite Brigade) of 8,000 troops to Korea. The Japanese force subsequently seized the emperor, occupied the Royal Palace in Seoul by 8 June 1894, and replaced the existing government with the members from the pro-Japanese faction. Though
Chinese troops were already leaving Korea, finding themselves unwanted
there, the new pro-Japanese Korean government granted Japan the right
to expel the Chinese troops forcefully, while Japan shipped more troops
to Korea. The legitimacy of the new government was rejected by China, and the stage was thus set for conflict.
Status of combatants
Japan
Japan's reforms under the Meiji emperor gave significant priority to naval construction, and the creation of an effective modern national army and navy. Japan
sent numerous military officials abroad for training, and evaluation of
the relative strengths and tactics of European armies and navies.
Imperial Japanese Navy
Ito Sukeyuki was the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was modeled after the British Royal Navy, which at the time was the foremost naval power in the world. British
advisors were sent to Japan to train, advise and educate the naval
establishment; while students were in turn sent to the United Kingdom to study and observe the Royal Navy. Through drilling and tuition by Royal Navy instructors, Japan was able to possess a navy expertly skilled in the arts of gunnery and seamanship.[5]
Japan did not yet have the resources to acquire battleships and so planned to employ the "Jeune Ecole" ("young school") doctrine which favoured small, fast warships, especially cruisers and torpedo boats, against bigger units.
Many of Japan’s major
warships were built in British and French shipyards (eight British,
three French and two Japanese-built) and 16 of the torpedo boats were
known to have been built in France and assembled in Japan.
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)
The Meiji era government at first modeled the army on the French Army. French advisers had been sent to Japan with two military missions (in 1872-1880 and 1884; these were the second and third missions respectively, the first having been under the shogunate). Nationwide conscription was enforced in 1873 and a western-style
conscript army was established; military schools and arsenals were also built.
In 1886 Japan turned toward the German Army, specifically the Prussian model as the basis for its army. Its doctrines, military system and organisation were studied in detail and adopted by the IJA. In 1885 Jakob Meckel,
a German adviser, implemented new measures, such as the reorganization
of the command structure of the army into divisions and regiments; the
strengthening of army logistics, transportation, and structures
(thereby increasing mobility); and the establishment of artillery and
engineering regiments as independent commands.
By the 1890s Japan had at
its disposal a modern, professionally-trained western-style army which
was relatively well equipped and supplied. Its officers had studied abroad and were well educated in the latest tactics and strategy. By the start of the war, the Imperial Japanese Army could field a total force of 120,000 men in two armies and five divisions.
China
Although the Beiyang Force -- Beiyang Army and Beiyang Fleet -- was the best equipped and symbolized the new modern Chinese military, corruption was a serious problem. Chinese politicians systematically embezzled funds, even during the war. As a result, the Beiyang Fleet did not purchase any battleships after its establishment in 1888. The purchase of ammunition stopped in 1891, with the funding being embezzled to build the Summer Palace in Beijing. Logistics were a huge problem, as construction of railroads in Manchuria had been discouraged. The morale of the Chinese armies was generally very low due to lack of pay and prestige, use of opium
and poor leadership which contributed to some rather ignominious
withdrawals, such as the abandonment of the very well-fortified and
defensible Weihaiwei.
Beiyang Army
Qing Dynasty China did not have a national army. Following the Taiping Rebellion the army had been segregated into separate Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Muslim) and Han Chinese armies, which were further divided into largely independent regional commands. During
the war, most of the fighting was done by the Beiyang Army and Beiyang
Fleet; pleas calling for help from other Chinese armies and navies were
completely ignored due to regional rivalry. The Huai and Anhwei armies made up the larger Beiyang Army.
Hui Chinese muslim officers and men saw service in Chinese forces against the Japanese.[6]
Beiyang Fleet
The Beiyang Fleet was one of the four modernised Chinese navies in the late Qing Dynasty. The navies were heavily sponsored by Li Hongzhang, the Viceroy of Zhili. The Beiyang Fleet was the dominant navy in East Asia before the first Sino-Japanese War. The Beiyang Fleet was said to be the "Best in Asia" and "The 8th largest in the world" during the late 1880s[citation needed]. However ships were not maintained properly and indiscipline was common.[7]
Dingyuan, the flagship of the Beiyang Fleet.
13 or so Torpedo boats, numerous gunboats and chartered merchant vessels
Early stages of the war
Genesis of the war
6 June 1894: The Chinese government informs the Japanese government under the obligation of the Convention of Tientsin of its military operation. About 2,465 Chinese soldiers were transported to Korea within days.
8 June 1894: First of around 4,000 Japanese soldiers and 500 marines land at Jemulpo (Incheon) despite Korean and Chinese protests.
13 June 1894: The Japanese government telegraphs the commander of the Japanese forces in Korea, Otori Keisuke, to remain in Korea for as long as possible despite the end of the rebellion.
16 June 1894: Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu meets with Wang Fengzao, Chinese ambassador to Japan, to discuss the future status of Korea. Wang
states that Chinese government intends to pull out of Korea after the
rebellion has been suppressed and expects Japan to do the same. However, China also appoints a resident to look after Chinese interests in Korea and to re-assert Korea’s traditional subservient status to
China.
22 June 1894: Additional Japanese troops arrive in Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi tells Matsukata Masayoshi
that he did not think that negotiations would work, and since the Qing
appeared to be making military preparations, there was probably "no
policy but to go to war." Mutsu Munemitsu tells Otori Keisuke to press the Korean government on the Japanese demands.
26 June 1894: Otori presents a set of refrom proposals to Gojong, which the Korean government rejects, and in return insists on troop withdrawals.
7 July 1894: Mediation between China and Japan arranged by the British ambassador to China fails.
19 July 1894: Establishment of Japanese Joint Fleet, consisting of almost all vessels in the Imperial Japanese Navy, in preparation for upcoming war. Mutsu Munemitsu cables Otori to take whatever steps he thought necessary to compel the Korean government to carry out a reform program,.
23 July 1894: Japanese troops enter Seoul, seize the Korean emperor and establish a new pro-Japanese government, which terminates all Sino-Korean treaties and grants the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Chinese Beiyang Army troops from Korea.
Events during the war
Footage of a naval battle during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894).
Opening moves
By July 1894 Chinese forces in Korea numbered 3000-3500 and could only be supplied by sea through the Bay of Asan. The Japanese objective was first to blockade the Chinese at Asan and then encircle them with their land forces.
Sinking of the Kow-shing
On 25 July 1894, the cruisers Yoshino, Naniwa and Akitsushima of the Japanese flying squadron, which had been patrolling off Asan, encountered the Chinese cruiser Tsi-yuan and gunboat Kwang-yi. These
vessels had steamed out of Asan in order to meet another Chinese gunboat, the Tsao-kiang, which was escorting a transport toward Asan. After a brief, hour-long engagement, the Tsi-yuan escaped while the Kwang-yi became stranded on rocks, where its powder-magazine exploded.
The Kow-shing was a 2,134-ton British merchant vessel owned by the Indochina Steam Navigation Company of London, commanded by Captain T. R. Galsworthy and crewed by 64 men. The ship was chartered by the Qing government to ferry troops to Korea; the Kow-shing was on her way to Asan to reinforce Chinese forces there: 1200 troops plus supplies and equipment were onboard the vessel. A German artillery officer, Major von Hanneken, acting as an advisor to the Chinese, was also aboard. The ship was due to arrive on 25 July.
The cruiser Naniwa (under the command of Captain Togo Heihachiro) intercepted the two ships. The gunboat was eventually captured. The Japanese then ordered the Kow-shing to follow the Naniwa and requested that the Europeans onboard be transferred to the Naniwa. However the 1,200 Chinese on board desired to return to Taku, and
threatened to kill the English captain, Galsworthy and his crew. After four hours of negotiations, Captain Togo gave the order to fire upon the vessel. A torpedo fired from the Naniwa missed the Kow Shing which then fired a broadside which hit the Kow shing;
this was enough to distract their Chinese guards and allowed some of
the Europeans to jump overboard only to be fired upon by the Chinese. The
Japanese rescued three of the 43 crew (the captain, first officer and
quartmaster) and a German passenger, and took them to Japan; the rest
died in the sinking. The sinking of the Kow-shing
almost caused a diplomatic incident between Japan and Great Britain,
but the action was ruled in conformity with international law regarding
the treatment of mutineers. Only
three ships rescued any Chinese troops. The German gunboat Iltis rescued 150 Chinese soldiers. The French Gunboat Le Lion rescued 43 Chinese soldiers. The Royal Navy Torpedo Cruiser Porpoise also rescued an unknown number of troops. No Japanese ships rescued Chinese troops in the water and it is estimated over 900 died in the sinking.[8]
Conflict in Korea
Japanese soldiers of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan, 1895.
Korean solders and Chinese captives
The battle of the Yalu river
Commissioned by the new pro-Japanese Korean government to expel the Chinese forces from Korean territory by force, Major-General Oshima Yoshimasa
led mixed Japanese brigades numbering about 4,000 on a rapid forced
march from Seoul south toward Asan Bay to face 3,500 Chinese troops
garrisoned at Seonghwan Station east of Asan and Kongju.
On 28 July 1894, the two forces met just outside Asan in an engagement that lasted till 0730 hours the next morning. The Chinese gradually lost ground to the superior Japanese numbers, and finally broke and fled towards Pyongyang. Chinese casualties amounted to 500 killed and wounded, compared to 82 Japanese casualties.
War between China and Japan was officially declared on 1 August 1894.
The remaining Chinese forces in Korea, by August 4, retreated to the northern city of Pyongyang, where they eventually joined troops sent from China. The 13,000-15,000 defenders made extensive repairs and preparations to the city, hoping to check the Japanese advance.
The Imperial Japanese Army converged on Pyongyang from several directions on 15 September 1894. The Japanese assaulted the city and eventually defeated the Chinese by an attack from the rear; the defenders surrendered. By
taking advantage of heavy rainfall and using the cover of darkness, the
remaining troops marched out of Pyongyang and headed northeast toward
the coast and the city of Uiju. Casualties were 2,000 killed and around
4,000 wounded for the Chinese, while the Japanese lost 102 men killed,
433 wounded and 33 missing. The entire Japanese army entered the city of Pyongyang on the early morning of 16 September 1894.
Defeat of the Beiyang fleet
The Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed 8 out of ten warships of the Chinese Beiyang Fleet off the mouth of the Yalu River on 17 September 1894. Japan's command of the sea was assured. The Chinese were able to land 4,500 troops near the Yalu River.
Invasion of Manchuria
With the defeat at Pyongyang, the Chinese abandoned northern Korea and instead took up defensive positions in fortifications along their side of the Yalu River near Jiuliangcheng. After receiving reinforcements by the 10 October, the Japanese quickly pushed north toward Manchuria.
On the night of 24 October 1894, the Japanese successfully crossed the Yalu River, undetected, by erecting a pontoon bridge. The following afternoon of 25 October at 5:00 pm, they assaulted the outpost of Hushan, east of Jiuliangcheng. At 10:30 pm the defenders deserted their positions and by the next day they were in full retreat from Jiuliangcheng. With the capture of Jiuliangcheng, General Yamagata's 1st Army Corps occupied the nearby city of Dandong; while to the north, elements of the retreating Beiyang Army set fire to the city of Fengcheng. The Japanese had established a firm foothold on Chinese territory with the loss of only four killed and 140 wounded.
The Japanese 1st Army Corps then split into two groups with General Nozu Michitsura's 5th Provincial Division advancing toward the city of Mukden and Lieutenant General Katsura Taro's 3rd Provincial Division pursuing fleeing Chinese forces west along toward the Liaodong Peninsula.
First Sino-Japanese War, major battles and troop movements.
Fall of Lushunkou
By 21 November 1894, the Japanese had taken the city of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur). The Japanese army massacred thousands of the city's civilian Chinese inhabitants in an event that came to be called the Port Arthur Massacre (note that the scale and nature of the killing continues to be debated). By 10 December 1894, Kaipeng (modern-day Gaixian) fell to the Japanese 1st Army Corps.
Fall of Weihaiwei and Aftermath
The Chinese fleet subsequently retreated behind the Weihaiwei fortifications. However, they were then surprised by Japanese ground forces, who outflanked the harbor's defenses. The
battle of Weihaiwei would be a 23-day siege with the major land and
naval components taking place between 20 January and 12 February 1895.
After Weihaiwei's fall
on 12 February 1895, and an easing of harsh winter conditions, Japanese
troops pressed further into southern Manchuria and northern China. By March 1895 the Japanese had fortified posts that commanded the sea approaches to Beijing. This would be the last major battle to be fought; numerous skirmishes would follow. The Battle of Yinkou was fought outside the port town of Yingkou, Manchuria, on 5 March 1895.
Occupation of Pescadores Islands (Penghu Islands)
On 23 March 1895, Japanese forces attacked the Pescadores Islands, off the west coast of Taiwan. In a brief and almost bloodless campaign the Japanese defeated the islands' Qing garrison and occupied the main town of Makung. This operation
effectively prevented Chinese forces in Taiwan from being reinforced,
and allowed the Japanese to press their demand for the cession of
Taiwan in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895.
End of the war
Japanese invasion of Taiwan
Several Qing officials in Taiwan resolved to resist the cession of Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and on 23 May declared the island to be an independent republic. On 29 May Japanese forces under Admiral Motonori Kabayama landed in northern Taiwan, and in a five-month campaign defeated the Republican forces and occupied the island's main towns. The campaign effectively ended on 21 October 1895, with the
flight of Liu Yung-fu, the second Republican president, and the surrender of the Republican capital Tainan.
War reparations
After the war, according to the Chinese scholar, Jin Xide, the Qing government paid a total of 340,000,000 taels of silver to Japan for both the reparations of war and war trophies. This was equivalent to (then) 510,000,000 Japanese yen, about 6.4 times the Japanese government revenue. Similarly, the Japanese scholar, Ryoko Iechika,
calculated that the Qing government paid a total of $21,000,000 (about
one-third of the revenue of the Qing government) in war reparations to
Japan, or about 320,000,000 Japanese yen, equivalent to two-and-half
years of Japanese government revenue.[citation needed]
Aftermath
The Japanese success during the war was the result of the modernization and industrialisation embarked upon two decades earlier. The war demonstrated the superiority of Japanese tactics and training as a result of the adoption of a western-style military. The
IJA and navy were able to inflict a string of defeats on the Chinese
through foresight, endurance, strategy and power of organization. Japanese prestige rose in the eyes of the world. The victory established Japan as a regional power (if not a great power) on equal terms with the west and as the dominant power in Asia.[9]
The war for China
revealed the ineffectiveness of its government, its policies, the
corruption of the administration system and the decaying state of the
Qing dynasty (something that had been recognized for decades). Anti-foreign sentiment and agitation grew, and would later culminate in the form of the Boxer Rebellion five years later. Throughout the 19th century the Qing dynasty was unable to prevent foreign encroachment. This,
together with calls for reform and the Boxer Rebellion, would be the
key factors that would lead to the 1911 revolution and the downfall of
the Qing dynasty in 1912.
Although Japan had
achieved what it had set out to accomplish, namely to end Chinese
influence over Korea, Japan reluctantly had been forced to relinquish
the Liaodong Peninsula, (Port Arthur), in exchange for an increased financial indemnity. The European powers (Russia
especially), while having no objection to the other clauses of the
treaty, did feel that Japan should not gain Port Arthur, for they had
their own ambitions in that part of the world. Russia persuaded Germany and France to join her in applying diplomatic pressure on the Japanese, resulting in the Triple Intervention of 23 April 1895.
In 1898 Russia signed a 25-year lease on the Liaodong Peninsula and proceeded to set up a naval station at Port Arthur. Although this infuriated the Japanese, they were more concerned with Russian encroachment toward Korea than in Manchuria. Other
powers, such as France, Germany and Great Britain, took advantage of
the situation in China and gained port and trade concessions at the
expense of the decaying Qing Empire. Tsingtao and Kiaochow was acquired by Germany, Kwang-Chou-Wan by France and Weihaiwei by Great Britain.
Tensions between Russia and Japan would increase in the years after the First Sino-Japanese war. During the Boxer Rebellion an eight member international force was sent to suppress and quell the uprising; Russia sent troops into Manchuria as part of this force. After the suppression of the Boxers the Russian government agreed to vacate the area. However, by 1903 it had actually increased the size of its forces in Manchuria. Negotiations
between the two nations (1901–1904) to establish mutual recognition of
respective spheres of influence (Russia over Manchuria and Japan over
Korea) were repeatedly and intentionally stalled by the Russians. They felt
that they were strong and confident enough not to accept any compromise
and believed Japan would not dare go to war against a European power. Russia also had intentions to use Manchuria as a springboard for further expansion of its interests in the Far East.
In 1902 Japan formed an alliance with Britain,
the terms of which stated that if Japan went to war in the Far East and
that a third power entered the fight against Japan, then Britain would
come to the aid of the Japanese. This was a check to prevent either Germany or France from intervening militarily in any future war with Russia. British
reasons for joining the alliance were also to check the spread of
Russian expansion into the Pacific arena, which would have threatened
British interests.
Increasing tensions
between Japan and Russia as a result of Russia's unwillingness to enter
into a compromise and the prospect of Korea falling under Russia's
domination, therefore coming into conflict with and undermining Japan's
interests, compelled Japan to take action. This would be the deciding factor and catalyst that would lead to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05.
See also
References
- ↑ "Japan Anxious for a Fight; The Chinese Are Slow and Not in Good Shape to Go to War," New York Times. July 30, 1894.
- ↑ Jansen, p.335
- ↑ www.ocu.mit.edu
- ↑ Jansen, p.431
- ↑ "The skills of the Japanese officers and men was [sic] astronomically higher those of their Chinese counterparts." [1]
- ↑ Michael Dillon (1999). Richmond: Curzon Press. p. 72. ISBN 0700710264, 9780700710263. http://books.google.com/books?id=hUEswLE4SWUC&pg=PA72&dq=ma+anliang&hl=en&ei=nMIWTOy1JoT6lweJyPGHDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAQ#v=snippet&q=hui%20officers%20and%20men%201894%20sino%20japanese%20war&f=falsetitle=China's Muslim Hui
community: migration, settlement and sects. Retrieved 2010-6-28.
- ↑ Naval Warfare, 1815-1914, Lawrence Sondhaus, p.168/170
- ↑ Sequence of events, and numbers of rescued and dead taken from several articles from The Times of London from 2 August 1894-25 October 1894
- ↑ "A new balance of power had emerged. China's millennia-long regional dominance had abruptly ended. Japan had become the dominant power of Asia, a position it would retain throughout the twentieth century". Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy.
Further reading
- Jansen, Marius B. (2002). The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00991-6.
- Chamberlin, William Henry. Japan Over Asia, 1937, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston.
- Colliers (Ed.), The Russo-Japanese War, 1904, P.F. Collier & Son, New York.
- Kodansha Japan An Illustrated Encyclopedia, 1993, Kodansha Press, Tokyo ISBN 4-06-205938-X
- Lone, Stewart. Japan's First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894-1895, 1994, St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Paine, S.C.M. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, Power, and Primacy, 2003, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 412 pp.
- Sedwick, F.R. (R.F.A.). The Russo-Japanese War, 1909, The Macmillan Company, NY, 192 pp.
- Theiss, Frank. The Voyage of Forgotten Men, 1937, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1st Ed., Indianapolis & New York.
- Warner, Dennis and Peggy. The Tide At Sunrise, 1974, Charterhouse, New York.
- Urdang, Laurence/Flexner, Stuart, Berg. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition. Random House, New York, (1969).
- Military Heritage did an editorial on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 (Brooke C. Stoddard, Military Heritage, December 2001, Volume 3, No. 3).
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 Second Sino-Japanese War 1937 - 1945
The Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937-September 9,
1945) was a major war fought between the Republic of China and the
Empire of Japan before and during World War II. It was the largest Asian war in the twentieth century. [2]
Although the two countries had fought intermittently since 1931,
full-scale war started in earnest in 1937 and ended only with the
surrender of Japan in 1945. The war was the result of a decades-long
Japanese imperialist
policy aiming to dominate China politically and militarily to secure
its vast raw material reserves and other resources. At the same time,
the rising tide of Chinese nationalism and notions of self
determination stoked the coals of war. Before 1937, China and Japan
fought in small, localized engagements in so-called "incidents." Yet,
the two sides, for a variety of reasons, refrained from fighting a
total war. The 1931 invasion of Manchuria
by Japan is known as the "Mukden Incident." The last of these incidents
was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, marking the official
beginning of full scale war between the two countries.
The invasion was condemned and declared illegal by the League of Nations but, as with the Italian occupation of Ethiopia
from 1935, it was not able to enforce any sanctions. From 1937 to 1941,
China fought alone. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Second Sino-Japanese War merged into the greater conflict of World War
II. Japan, like Italy, was late in launching its the extra-territorial
imperial project. This was not an expression of the will of the people,
but of the militaristic leaders of the nation at the time. However, it
was also an assertion of Japan's status as a power in her own right.
Having successfully warded off the interference by the European colonial powers of the U.S.,
she now aspired to become an imperial power in the image of those who
had tried to dominate her, so blame for atrocities that were committed
ought properly to be shared. All imperial powers, including those who
censured Japan's actions as immoral, have committed crimes against
humanity. Nomenclature
In Chinese, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against Japan, and also known as the Eight Years' War of Resistance, or simply War of Resistance.
In Japan, the name Japan-China War is most commonly used because of its neutrality. When the war began in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan used North China Incident, Hokushi Jihen ), and with the outbreak of war in Central China next month, it was changed to China Incident, Shina Jihen ).The word incident, jihen) was used by Japan as
neither country had declared war on each other. Japan wanted to avoid
intervention by other countries such as the United Kingdom and particularly the United States, which had been the biggest steel exporter to Japan. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt
would have had to impose an embargo due to the Neutrality Acts had the fighting been named a war. In Japanese propaganda however, the invasion of China became a "holy war" (seisen), the first step of the Hakko ichiu
(eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940, prime minister
Konoe thus launched the League of Diet Members Believing the Objectives
of the Holy War. When both sides formally declared war in December
1941, the name was replaced by Greater East Asia War, Daitōa Sensō). Although the Japanese government still uses "China Incident" in formal documents, because the word Shina is considered a derogatory word by China, media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident ( Nikka Jihen, Nisshi Jihen), which were used by media even in the 1930s. Also, the name Second Sino-Japanese War is not usually used in Japan, as the First Sino-Japanese War, Nisshin-Sensō), between Japan and the Qing Dynasty in 1894 is not regarded to have obvious direct linkage with the second, between Japan and the Republic of China. Background
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced the Kuomintang policy of resistance against Japan at Lushan on July 10, 1937, three days after the Battle of Lugou Bridge.
The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Taiwan and recognize the independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts
and foreign imperialism,
while Japan had emerged as a great power through its effective measures
of modernization. The Republic of China was founded in 1912, following
the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the
nascent Republic was even weaker than its predecessor because of the
dominance of warlords. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism
seemed a very remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves
with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For
example, warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the
Republic that Japan became the
greatest foreign threat to China. In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. Following World War I, Japan acquired the German sphere of influence in Shandong.
China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to
resist foreign incursions until the Northern Expedition of 1926-28,
launched by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) in Guangzhou
against various warlords. The Northern Expedition swept through China
until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang
Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the Kuomintang
Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the Jinan
Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were
engaged in a short conflict. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang
Zuolin was also assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate
with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928.
Japanese troops entering Shenyang during Mukden Incident.
Still, numerous conflicts between China and Japan persisted as
Chinese nationalism had been on the rise and one of the ultimate goals
of the Three Principles of the People was to rid China of foreign
imperialism. However, the Northern Expedition had only nominally
unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and
rival Kuomintang factions. In addition, the Chinese Communists revolted
against the central government following a purge of its members.
Because of these situations, the Chinese central government diverted
much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of
"first internal pacification before external resistance." This
situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its goals.
In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria right after the Mukden
Incident. After five months of fighting, in 1932, the puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations
for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton
Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led
Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and
throughout the 1930s, appeasement was the policy of the international
community and no country was willing to take an active stance other
than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw
materials and as a buffer state against the Soviet Union. Incessant conflicts followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese
and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the January 28 Incident.
The war resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai,
which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In
Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the volunteer armies
that arose from the popular frustration at the policy of nonresistance
to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region,
and in its wake the Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the
control of Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great
Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another
buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist
government whose capital was Nanjing. In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts
among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This
was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern
Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government only
extended around the Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of
China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus,
Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional
powers to undermine the efforts of the central Nationalist government
in bringing unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various Chinese
collaborators and helped these men lead governments that were friendly
to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (Chinese: 華北特殊化; pinyin: húaběitèshūhùa),
or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The
northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong. This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now
Inner Mongolia and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China
signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting
party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the Ching-Doihara
Agreement was signed and vacated the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end
of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated North
China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council
and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established. There in the
vacated area of Chahar the Mongol Military Government was formed on May
12, 1936 with Japan providing military and economic aid. This
government tried to take control of Suiyuan in late 1936 and early 1937
but was defeated. Immediately after the successful outcome of this
campaign the Xi'an Incident occurred resulting temporarily in the end
of the Chinese Civil War and the forming of a United Front of the CPC and KMT against Japan on December 24, 1936. Japan's invasion of China
Casualties
of a mass panic during a June 1941 Japanese bombing of Chongqing. More
than 5000 civilians died during the first two days of air raids in 1939. [3]
Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese
War on July 7, 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, when a crucial
access point to Beijing was assaulted by the Japanese. Some Chinese
historians, however place the starting point at the Mukden Incident of
September 18, 1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese
Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of
Manchukuo on February 18 1932. Japan tried forcing the Chinese
government to recognize the independence of Manchukuo. However, when
the League of Nations determined that Manchukuo was a product of Japanese aggression, Japan withdrew from the League. Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, the
Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Southern Shanxi in campaigns
involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably
more Chinese soldiers. Historians estimate up to 300,000 people
perished in the Nanking Massacre,
after the fall of Nanjing on December 13, 1937, while some Japanese
historians denied the existence of a massacre at all. The height of
Japanese army advance culminated in capturing the city of Wuhan. Aerial combat between the Chinese Air Force and the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces began in earnest in August 1937. By
the end of 1940 the Chinese air force was effectively wiped out because
China lacked the technological, industrial and military infrastructure
to replace aircraft lost during combat. Throughout the next few years,
the Imperial air force of the Navy and the Army launched the world's
first massive air bombing raids of civilian targets on nearly every
major city in China, leaving millions dead, injured, and homeless.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an
open, undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the
formation of the Second United Front between the Kuomintang
(KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The cooperation took place
with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP. The high point of the
cooperation came in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan. However, the
distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy
alliance began to break down by late 1938, despite Japan's steady
territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River
Valley in central China. After 1940, open conflict between the
Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas outside
Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident. The
Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were
presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and
tax reform measures favoring peasants, while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence and fight the Japanese at the same time.
Japanese marines at Guangdong in the Battle of Wuhan.
The Japanese implemented a strategy of creating friendly puppet
governments favorable to Japanese interests in the territories
conquered. However, the atrocities committed by the Japanese army made
these governments very unpopular and ineffective. The Japanese did
succeed in recruiting and forming a large Collaborationist Chinese Army
to maintain public security in the occupied areas.
By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnam, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing.
China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in
modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against
Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the
poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies
and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at
large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and
equipped army defending Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his
generals, who maintained a high degree independence from the central
KMT government. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous
casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance in China and already
developed problems in administering and garrisoning the seized
territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner
resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany. Chinese resistance strategy
Chinese soldiers march to the front in 1939.
The basis of Chinese strategy during the war can be divided into three periods:
First Period: July 7, 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge)–October 25, 1938 (Fall of Wuhan).
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war
and had little military-industrial strength, no mechanized divisions,
and few armored forces. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the
League of Nations
would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the
Kuomintang government was mired in a civil war against the Communists,
as Chiang was famously quoted: "The Japanese are a disease of the skin,
the Communists are a disease of the heart." Though the Communists
formed the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally
under the command of the National Revolutionary Army, the United Front
was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with
the other once the Japanese were driven out. Even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States
or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable
of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang
decided to make a stand in the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang sent the best
of his German-trained divisions to defend China's largest and most
industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle lasted over three
months saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese
retreat towards Nanjing. While this was a military defeat for the
Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed
China's determination to the world, which became an enormous morale
booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt that
Japan could conquer Shanghai in three days and China in three months. Afterward, the Chinese began to adopt the strategy of "trading space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間).
The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to
northern and eastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its
professionals and key industries, to retreat west into Chongqing.
As a result of Chinese troops' scorched earth strategies, where dams
and levees were intentionally sabotaged to create massive flooding, the
consecutive Japanese advancements and conquests began to stall in
late-1938.
Chinese soldiers in house-to-house fighting in Battle of Tai'erzhuang.
Second Period: October 25, 1938 (Fall of Wuhan) - April 1944 (before Operation Ichi-Go).
During this period, the Chinese main objective was to prolong the
war. Therefore, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic
warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where
they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in
major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the
successful defense of Changsha numerous times.
Also, CCP and other local guerrillas forces continued their
resistance in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their
administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the
Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the
countryside were almost always hotbeds of partisan activity.
By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making
minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from
oncoming Japanese on several occasions, while strong resistance in
areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the
Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ the
"Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all), Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On: Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that the bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed. Third Period: April 17, 1944 (Operation Ichi-Go)-August 15, 1945 (Japanese Surrender).
At this stage Japan conducted its final offensive in China.
Although large areas were captured in this massive operation, the
Japanese military resources were exhausted and its army stretched to
the limit. This allowed the Chinese to begin general full frontal
counter-attacks to take back cities lost during Operation Ichi-Go, but
these operations ended abruptly after the Japanese surrendered.
Foreign involvement
German military personnel in China, 1936
I-16 with Chinese insignia. I-16 was the main fighter plane used by the Chinese Air Force and Soviet volunteers.
The Second Sino-Japanese War was not just a war between Japan and
China, but involved many nations that had different vested interests
that influenced their position and action taken during different phases
of this war. It is clear that China had an intensely difficult task at
hand in attempting to win Allies' support while they had motives not necessarily in congruence with China's. At the outbreak of full scale war, many global powers were
reluctant to provide support to China; because in their opinion the
Chinese would eventually lose the war, and they did not wish to
antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial
possessions in the region. They expected any support given to
Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who
taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within three
months.
However, Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theater of World War II.
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and China had close economic
and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its
industry and military in exchange for raw materials. More than half of
the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China.
Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped and trained with
Germany assistance did not materialize when Germany withdrew its
support in 1938. The Soviet Union wished to keep China in the war to
hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a
two front war. In September 1937 the Soviet leadership signed
Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, began aiding China and approved
Operation Zet, a Soviet volunteer air force. As part of the secret
operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese
war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisers
arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the
Battle of Halhin Gol. Prior to the entrance of Western allies, the
Soviet Union provided the largest amount of foreign aid to China,
totaling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. In
1941 Soviet aid ended as a result of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact and the beginning of Great Patriotic War. This pact avoided the
Soviet Union from fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time. From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay and the Nanking Massacre,
swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased
their fear of Japanese expansionism, which prompted United States, the United
Kingdom, and France to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to Kuomintang. Furthermore, Australia
prevented a Japanese Government-owned company from taking over an iron
mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports in 1938. Japan
retaliated by invading Vietnam in 1940, and successfully blockaded
China and prevented import of arms, fuel and 10,000 metric tons/month
of materials supplied by the Western Powers through the Haiphong-Yunnan
Fou railway line. By mid-1941, the United States organized the American Volunteer
Group, or Flying Tigers. Their early combat success of 300 kills
against a loss of 12 of their shark painted P-40 fighters earned them
wide recognition at the time when Allies were suffering heavy losses.
Entering soon after the U.S. and Japan were at war, their dog fighting
tactics would be adopted by U.S. forces. They would also transmit the
appreciative Chinese thumbs-up gesture for number one into military
culture. In addition, the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands
East Indies began oil and/or steel embargos. The loss of oil imports
made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set
the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attack against the
western Allies, when the Imperial Navy raided Pearl Harbor on December
8, 1941 (December 7 in U.S. time zones).
Entrance of Western Allies
Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United
States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek
continued to receive supplies from the United States, as the Chinese
conflict was merged into the Asian theater of World War II. However, in
contrast to the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed
open most of the war, sea routes to China had long been closed, so
between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the
Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be
flown in over The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been
captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union could spare little
from the Eastern Front. Because of these reasons, the Chinese
government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount a major
offensive.
Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China
theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's
Chief of Staff, while commanding U.S. forces in the China Burma India
Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke
down, because of a number of factors. Some historians suggested it is
largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese
government. However, some historians believed it was a more complicated
situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume control of Chinese
troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Stilwell did not appreciate
the complexity of the situation, including the buildup of the Chinese
Communists during the war (essentially Chiang had to fight a
multi-front war—the Japanese on one side, the Communists on the other)
Stilwell criticized the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the
American media, and to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Chiang was
hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops away from the main front because
China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed
that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming
industrial output and manpower. The Allies began to lose confidence in
the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian
mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese
in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an
island hopping strategy.
Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war. Winston Churchill
was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were
defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma
Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the
Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were
under Japanese control. Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did
not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the later British insistence
that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma
Campaign was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese
manpower to secure Britain's colonial holdings in Southeast Asia and
prevent the gate to India
from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert
its troops to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American
bombers, a strategy that U.S. General Claire Chennault supported. In
addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian independence in a meeting
with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom. The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a
large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a location for
American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In
1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast,
the Imperial Japanese Army launched Operation Ichigo to attack the
airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hunan, Henan, and Guangxi
provinces under Japanese administration. The failure of the Chinese
forces to defend these areas led to the replacement of Stilwell by
Major General Albert Wedemeyer. However, Chinese troops under the
command of Sun Li-jen drove out the Japanese in North Burma to secure
the Ledo Road, a supply route to China. In Spring 1945, the Chinese
launched offensives and retook Guangxi and other southwestern regions.
With the Chinese army well in the progress training and equipping,
Albert Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945
to retake Guangdong, obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not
put into
action. Conclusion and aftermath
As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at
least another year. On August 6, an American B-29 bomber dropped the
first atomic bomb used in combat on Hiroshima.
On August 9, the Soviet Union renounced its non-aggression pact with
Japan and attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta Conference
pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the end of the
war in Europe. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups. In less
than two weeks the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, consisting of over a
million men but lacking in adequate armor, artillery, or air support,
and depleted of many of its best soldiers by the demands of the Allies'
Pacific drive, had been destroyed by the Soviets. Later in the day on
August 9, a second atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on
Nagasaki. Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies on August 15, 1945, and the official surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri on September 2. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on
September 9, 1945, and by the
provisions of the Cairo
Conference of 1943, the lands of Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the Ryukyu Islands were maintained as Japanese territory.
The Chinese return to Liuchow (Liuzhou) in July 1945.
In 1945, China emerged from the war nominally a great military
power but was actually a nation economically prostrated and on the
verge of all-out civil war.
The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of a long,
costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by
Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in
the wake of the war, as large swathes of the prime farming areas had
been ravaged by the fighting. Millions were rendered homeless by floods
and the destruction of towns and cities in many parts of the country.
The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and
of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were
staggering. The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at
the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into
Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan. Although the
Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they
had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the
Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the
war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a
Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more
than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The
Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in
long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the
withdrawing Japanese army.
Japanese Instrument of Surrender.
The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies
left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists,
both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and
elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao Zedong was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism
to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by
living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their
thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion,
indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army
fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the
people. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was effectively
split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White"
(cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a
split that would later sow future factionalism within the CCP.
Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a
seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment
of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940
he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual
seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CCP
power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of
the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao Zedong Thought."
With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, all out war broke out
between the KMT and CCP, a war that would leave the Nationalists
banished to Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the mainland. Legacy: Who fought the War of Resistance?
China War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial Museum on the site where Marco Polo Bridge Incident took place.
The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war
effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese remains a
controversial issue.
In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial
near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that it was the Communist Party
that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist
the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the
political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist
generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The
official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet
indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CCP that
engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines.
This emphasis on the CCP's central role is partially reflected by the
PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of
Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the
PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting
the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown
with the Communists. However, for the sake of Chinese reunification and
appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the
Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the
victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any
political party.
Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third
party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different
view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a
minuscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the
Nationalists and used guerrilla warfare as well as opium sales to
preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang.
This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by
history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for
the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the
Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major
battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between
China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter
Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists
and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He
also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese
Communists to visit the frontline,
although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly
optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties.
The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments
Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions),
preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply
lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the
Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 87th,
88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend
Shanghai from the Japanese. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang
rather than the Communists as their main enemy
and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point
that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.
The KMT army suffered some 3.2 million casualties while the CCP
increased its military strength from minimally significant numbers to
1.7 million men. This change in strength was a direct result of
Japanese forces fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away
from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi.
While the PRC government has been accused of greatly exaggerating
the CCP's role in fighting the Japanese, the legacy of the war is more
complicated in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Traditionally, the
government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on September 9
(now known as Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on
October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the more
pro-Taiwan independence pan-green coalition and the rise of
desensitization, events commemorating the war have become less
commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwan independence see no relevance in
preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily
on mainland China (and even sympathize with Japanese actions). Still,
commemorations are held in regions where politics is dominated by the
pan-blue coalition. Many pan-blue supporters, particularly veterans who
retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest
in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the
end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of pan-blue stronghold Taipei
held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the
war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in
the KMT headquarters.
To this day the war is a major point of contention between China
and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese
relations, and many people, particularly in China, harbor grudges over
the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese
nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed
to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbors is often glorified or
whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women,
and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese
government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing
the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's
militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook
revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to
stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up
nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal
matters. Casualties assessment
A baby in Shanghai's South Station after a Japanese bombing
The conflict lasted for 8 years, 1 month, and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).
Chinese casualties
- The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which
involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor
engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both
sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
- The Chinese casualties were 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13
million civilians who died in the crossfire, and another 8.4 million as
non-military casualties. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at
least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, loot all, burn all"
operation (Three Alls Policy, or sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942
in North China by general Yasuji Okamura and authorized on December 3,
1941 by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.
Chinese sources list the total military and non-military casualties, dead and wounded, of the Chinese were 35 million. Most Western historians believed that the casualties were at least 20 million. Property loss of the Chinese valued
up to 383 billion US dollars according to the
currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times
the GDP of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion).
- In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.
Japanese casualties
The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military
casualties, killed, wounded and missing, although this number is
disputed. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense
ministry was only about 200,000, but this is believed to be extremely
low when considering the length of the conflict. The combined Chinese
forces claimed to have killed at most 1.77 million Japanese soldiers
during the eight-year war.
Number of troops involved
National Revolutionary Army
Flag of the National Revolutionary Army.
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan
employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions,
46 New Divisions, 12 Cavalry Divisions, 8 New Cavalry Divisions, 66
Temporary Divisions, and 13 Reserve Divisions, for a grand total of 515
divisions. However, many divisions were formed from two or more other
divisions, and many were not active at the same time. The number of
active divisions, at the start of the war in 1937, was about 170 NRA
divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese
army was roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of
manpower but the Chinese forces largely lacked artillery, heavy
weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware
meant that three to four Chinese armies had the firepower of only one
Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available
artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist
brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more
problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination.
The relative fighting strength of a Chinese division was even weaker
when relative capacity in aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, are taken into account. The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called dixi ( 嫡系,
"direct descent") group, which comprised divisions trained by the
Whampoa Military Academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be
considered the Central Army of the NRA. The second group is known as
the zapai, "miscellaneous units"), and comprised all divisions
led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional
Army or the Provincial Army. Even though both military groups were part
of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in
their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many
former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA
under the flag of the Kuomintang,
but in reality they retained much independence from the central
government. They also controlled much of the military strength of
China, the most notable of them being the Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and
Ma Cliques. Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a
nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to
their guerrilla
status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total
number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the
Communist armies at 1,300,000. For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies
and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second
Sino-Japanese War.
Imperial Japanese Army
Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army.
- The IJA had approximately 3,200,000 regulars. More Japanese troops
were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the Pacific Theater
during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its
divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered
greater than 100. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the IJA had
51 divisions of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades of
which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the
IJA's manpower.
- The Collaborationist Chinese Army in 1938 had 78,000 people, and
grew to 145,000 in 1940. Their growth was explosive around 1942-43
reaching 649,640 in a March 17 1943 British Intelligence reports.
According to KMT estimates 1,186,000 people were involved in the
collaborationist army by the war's end. At their height they fielded a
maximum of 900,000 troops. Almost all of them belonged to the regional
puppet governments such as Manchukuo,
Provisional Government of the Republic of China (Beijing), Reformed
Government of the Republic of China (Nanjing) and the later
collaborationist Nanjing Nationalist Government or Wang Jingwei regime.
The puppet and collaborationist troops were mainly assigned to garrison
and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in
occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low
morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes
against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CCP.
Chinese and Japanese equipment
The National Revolutionary Army
The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with
approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry
divisions, two artillery brigades,
16 artillery regiments and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy
displaced only 59,000 metric tons and the Chinese Air Force comprised
only about 700 obsolete aircraft. Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong
arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the
standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k.
A local variant of the 98k style rifles were often called the "Chiang
Kai-shek rifle" a Chinese copy from the Mauser Standard Model. Another rifle they used was Hanyang 88. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the famous Maschinengewehr 34s
from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in
these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy
machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns,
from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol. Some divisions were equipped with 37 mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns,
and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry
division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20 mm
autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were
equipped with Bofors 72 mm L/14, or Krupp 72 mm L/29 mountain guns.
They were 24 Rheinmetall 150 mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Krupp 150 mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).
Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg
wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the
primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were
the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the
moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht
until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in
1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each
with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment
included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and
leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued
ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives,
food bag, and a gas mask.
On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of
equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously
under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao Teams and the Yunnanese army. Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of Guangxi's army was almost on par with the Central Army's, as the Guangzhou
region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors
and arms. The Muslim Ma clique to the Northwest was famed for its
well-trained cavalry divisions. The Imperial Japanese Army
Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational
capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long
sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese
Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men,
5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns
of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces
were also available. The Japanese Navy
displaced a total of 1,900,000 metric tons, ranking third in the world,
and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was
the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions
(at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai (1937)). Major figures
China: Nationalist
- Bai Chongxi
- Chen Cheng
- Chiang Kai-Shek
- Du Yuming
- Fang Xianjue
- Feng Yuxiang
- Gu Zhutong
- He Yingqin
- H. H. Kung
- Hu Kexian
- Hu Zongnan
- Li Zongren
- Long Yun
- Ma Zhanshan
- Song Zheyuan
- Soong May-ling
- T. V. Soong
- Sun Lianzhong
- Sun Liren
- Tang Enbai
- Tang Shengzhi
- Wang Jingwei
- Wei Lihuang
- Xue Yue
- Yan Xishan
- Xie Jinyuan
- Ye Ting
- Zhang Fakui
- Zhang Zhizhong
- Zhang Zizhong
- Zhu Shaoliang
|
China: Communist
|
Japan: Imperial Japanese Army
- Emperor Shōwa
- Abe Nobuyuki
- Anami Korechika
- Prince Asaka Yasuhiko
- Prince Chichibu Yasuhito
- Doihara Kenji
- Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu
- Hashimoto Kingoro
- Hata Shunroku
- Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko
- Honma Masaharu
- Ishii Shiro
- Isogai Rensuke
- Itagaki Seishiro
- Prince Kan'in Kotohito
- Konoe Fumimaro (Kyūjitai)
- Kanji Ishiwara
- Koiso Kuniaki
- Matsui Iwane
- Mutaguchi Renya
- Kesago Nakajima
- Toshizo Nishio
- Yasuji Okamura
- Sakai Takashi
- Sugiyama Hajime
- Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi
- Terauchi Hisaichi
- Tojo Hideki (Kyūjitai)
- Umezu Yoshijiro
- Yamaguchi Tamon
- Yamashita Tomoyuki
|
Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Battles
Battles with articles. Flag shows victorious side in each
engagement. Date shows beginning date except for the 1942 battle of
Changsha, which began in Dec. 1941.
 Mukden September 1931
- Invasion of Manchuria September 1931
- Jiangqiao Campaign October 1931
 Resistance at Nenjiang Bridge November 1931
- Jinzhou December 1931
- Defense of Harbin January 1932
-
 Shanghai (1932) January 1932
- Pacification of Manchukuo March 1932
- Great Wall January 1933
- Battle of Rehe February 1933
- Actions in Inner Mongolia (1933-36)
- Suiyuan Campaign October 1936
- Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937
- Beiping-Tianjin July 1937
- Chahar August 1937
- Battle of Shanghai August 1937
- Beiping–Hankou August 1937
- Tianjin–Pukou August 1937
- Taiyuan September 1937
- Battle of Pingxingguan September 1937
- Battle of Xinkou September 1937
- Battle of Nanjing December 1937
- Battle of Xuzhou December 1937
- Battle of Taierzhuang March 1938
- Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938
- Battle of Lanfeng May 1938
- Xiamen May 1938
- Battle of Wuhan June 1938
- Battle of Wanjialing
- Guangdong October 1938
- Hainan Island February 1939
- Battle of Nanchang March 1939
- Battle of Xiushui River March 1939
- Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939
- Shantou June 1939
- Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939
- Battle of South Guangxi November 1939
- Battle of Kunlun Pass December 1939
- 1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939
- Battle of Wuyuan March 1940
- Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940
- Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940
- Vietnam Expedition September 1940
- Central Hupei November 1940
- Battle of South Henan January 1941
- Western Hopei March 1941
- Battle of Shanggao March 1941
- Battle of South Shanxi May 1941
- Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941
- Battle of Changsha (1942) January 1942
- Battle of Yunnan-Burma Road March 1942
- Battle of Toungoo
-
 Battle of Yenangyaung
- Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi April 1942
- Battle of West Hubei May 1943
- Battle of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan October 1943
- Battle of Changde November 1943
- Operation Ichi-Go
- Operation Kogo Battle of Central Henan April 1944
- Operation Togo 1 Battle of Changsha (1944)
- Operation Togo 2 and Operation Togo 3 Battle of Guilin-LiuzhouAugust 1944
- Battle of West Hunan April - June 1945
- Second Guangxi Campaign April - July 1945
 Operation August Storm August – September 1945
Aerial engagements
- Aerial Engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Japanese invasions and operations
- Japanese Campaigns in Chinese War
- Chinchow Operation
- Manchukuoan Anti Bandit Operations
- Operation Nekka
- Peiking-Hankou Railway Operation
- Tientsin–Pukow Railway Operation
- Operation Quhar
- Kuolichi-Taierhchuang Operation
- Canton Operation
- Amoy Operation
- Hainan Island Operation
- Han River Operation
- Invasion of French Indochina
- Swatow Operation
- Sczechwan Invasion
- CHE-KIANG Operation
- Kwanchow-Wan Occupation
- Operation Ichi-Go
List of Japanese political and military incidents
Attacks on civilians
- Nanking Massacre
- Unit 731
- Unit 100
- Unit 516
- Unit 1855
- Unit 2646
- Unit 8604
- Unit 9420
- Unit Ei 1644
- Comfort women
- Sanko sakusen
- Shantung Incident
- Taihoku Air Strike
- Bombing of Chongqing
- Kaimingye germ weapon attack
- Changteh Chemical Weapon Attack
- Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi
- Sook Ching Massacre (specifically against Chinese nationals in Singapore)
Nanjing Massacre
From New World Encyclopedia
The Nanjing Massacre, commonly known as "The Rape of Nanking,"
was an infamous war crime committed by the Japanese military in and
around the then capital of China, Nanjing, after it fell to the
Imperial Japanese Army on December 13, 1937 (at the time, Nanjing was
known in English as Nanking). The duration of the massacre is not
clearly defined, although the violence lasted well into the next six
weeks until early February 1938.
During the occupation of Nanjing, the Japanese army committed numerous atrocities, such as rape, looting, arson and the execution of prisoners of war
and civilians. Although the executions began under the pretext of
eliminating Chinese soldiers disguised as civilians, a large number of
innocent men were intentionally identified as enemy combatants and
executed—or simply killed outright—as the massacre gathered momentum. A
large number of women and children were also killed, as rape and murder
became more widespread. The extent of the atrocities is debated between China and Japan, with numbers ranging from some Japanese claims of several hundred, to the Chinese claim of a non-combatant death toll of 300,000. A
number of Japanese researchers consider 100,000–200,000 to be an approximate
value. Other nations
usually believe the death toll to be between 150,000–300,000.
This number was first promulgated in January 1938 by Harold Timperly, a
journalist in China during the Japanese invasion, based on reports from
contemporary eyewitnesses. Other sources, including Iris Chang's
commercially-successful book, The Rape of Nanking, also promote 300,000 as the death toll.
While the Japanese government has acknowledged the incident did
occur, some Japanese nationalists have argued, partly using the
Imperial Japanese Army's claims at the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, that the death toll was military in nature and that
no civilian atrocities ever occurred. This claim has been refuted by
various figures, citing statements of non-Chinese at the Tribunal,
other eyewitnesses and by photographic and archaeological evidence that
civilian deaths did occur. Present Sino-Japanese relations—and Japanese
relations with much of the rest of the East Asian region—are
complicated by the historical embitterment of these nations with
Japan's actions before and during World War II. As Japan makes progress
in admitting to its injurious actions toward its neighbors, however
belated, relations within the region will likely improve and become
more cooperative.
Historical background
Invasion of China
By August of 1937, in the midst of the Second Sino-Japanese War,
the Imperial Japanese Army encountered strong resistance and suffered
high casualties in the Battle of Shanghai. The battle was bloody, as
both sides were worn down by attrition in hand-to-hand combat. On August 5, 1937, Hirohito
personally ratified his army's proposition to remove the constraints of
international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners. This directive
also advised staff officers to stop using the term "prisoner of war". On the way from Shanghai to Nanjing, Japanese soldiers committed
numerous atrocities, indicating that the Nanjing Massacre was not an
isolated incident. The most famous event was the "contest to kill 100 people using a sword."
By mid-November, the Japanese had captured Shanghai with the help
of naval and aerial bombardment. The General Staff Headquarters in
Tokyo decided not to expand the war, due to the high casualties
incurred and the low morale of the troops.
Approach towards Nanjing
As the Japanese Army drew closer to Nanjing, Chinese civilians
fled the city in droves, and the Chinese military put into effect a
scorched earth campaign, aimed at destroying anything that might be of
value to the invading Japanese army. Targets within and without the
city walls—such as military barracks, private homes, the Chinese
Ministry of Communication, forests and even entire villages—were burnt
to cinders, at an estimated value of 20 to 30 million (1937) US dollars. Chinese Fight Foe Outside Nanking; On December 2, Emperor Showa nominated one of his uncles, prince
Asaka, as commander of the invasion. It is difficult to establish if,
as a member of the imperial family, Asaka had a superior status to
general Iwane Matsui, who was officially commander in chief, but it is
clear that, as the top ranking officer, he had authority over divisions
commanders, lieutenant-generals Kesago Nakajima and Heisuke Yanagawa.
Nanjing Safety Zone
Many Westerners were living in the city at the time, conducting
trade or on missionary trips with various religious groups. As the
Japanese Army began to launch bombing raids over Nanjing, most
Westerners and all reporters fled to their respective countries except
for 22 persons. Siemens businessman John Rabe (presumably because of
his status as a Nazi and the German-Japanese bilateral Anti-Comintern
Pact) stayed behind and formed a committee, called the International
Committee for the Nanjing Safety Zone. Rabe was elected as its leader.
This committee established the Nanjing Safety Zone in the western
quarter of the city. The Japanese government had agreed not to attack
parts of the city that did not contain Chinese military, and the
members of the International Committee for the Nanjing Safety Zone
managed to persuade the Chinese government to move all their troops out
of the area.
The Japanese did respect the Zone to an extent; no shells entered
that part of the city leading up to the Japanese occupation, except a
few stray shots. During the chaos following the attack of the city,
some people were killed in the Safety Zone, but the atrocities in the
rest of the city were far greater by all accounts.
Siege of the city
Iwane Matsui enters Nanjing.
On December 7, the Japanese army issued a command to all troops,
advising that because occupying a foreign capital was an unprecedented
event for the Japanese military, those soldiers who "[commit] any
illegal acts," "dishonor the Japanese Army," "loot," or "cause a fire
to break out, even because of their carelessness" would be severely
punished
The Japanese military continued to march forward, breaching the last
lines of Chinese resistance, and arriving outside the walled city of
Nanjing on December 9. At noon, the military dropped leaflets into the
city, urging the surrender of Nanjing within 24 hours: - The Japanese Army, one million strong, has already conquered
[Changshu]. We have surrounded the city of Nanjing… The Japanese Army
shall show no mercy toward those who offer resistance, treating them
with extreme severity, but shall harm neither innocent civilians nor
Chinese military [personnel] who manifest no hostility. It is our
earnest desire to preserve the East Asian culture. If your troops
continue to fight, war in Nanjing is inevitable. The culture that has
endured for a millennium will be reduced to ashes, and the government
that has lasted for a decade will vanish into thin air. This
commander-in-chief issues [b]ills to your troops on behalf of the
Japanese Army. Open the gates to Nanjing in a peaceful manner, and obey
the [f]ollowing instructions.
The Japanese awaited an answer. When no Chinese envoy had arrived
by 1:00 p.m. the following day, General Matsui Iwane issued the command
to take Nanjing by force. On December 12, after two days of Japanese
attack, under heavy artillery fire and aerial bombardment, General Tang
Sheng-chi ordered his men to retreat. What followed was nothing short
of chaos. Some Chinese soldiers stripped civilians of their clothing in
a desperate attempt to blend in, and many others were shot in the back
by their own comrades as they tried to flee. Those who actually made it outside the city walls fled north to the Yangtze River, only to find that there were no vessels remaining to
take them. Some then jumped into the wintry waters and drowned. On December 13, the Japanese entered the walled city of Nanjing, facing hardly any military resistance.
Atrocities begin
Chinese civilians being buried alive.
Remains in the wharves of Hsiakwan (Xiaguan), the port suburb north of Nanjing. (photographed by Murase Moriyasu, of the 17th Motorized Company of the Supply and Transport Regiment).
Eyewitness accounts from the period state that over the course of
six weeks following the fall of Nanjing, Japanese troops engaged in
rape, murder, theft, and arson. The most reliable accounts came from
foreigners who opted to stay behind in order to protect Chinese
civilians from certain harm, including the diaries of John Rabe and
Minnie Vautrin. Others include first-person testimonies of the Nanjing
Massacre survivors. Still more were gathered from eyewitness reports of
journalists, both Western and Japanese, as well as the field diaries of
certain military personnel. An American
missionary, John Magee, stayed behind to provide a 16mm film
documentary and first-hand photographs of the Nanjing Massacre. This
film is called the Magee Film. It is often quoted as an important
evidence of the Nanjing Massacre. In addition, although few Japanese
veterans have admitted to having participated in atrocities in Nanjing,
some—most notably Shiro Azuma—have admitted to criminal behavior. Immediately after the city's fall, a group of foreign expatriates
headed by John Rabe formed the 15-man International Committee on
November 22 and drew up the Nanjing Safety Zone in order to safeguard
the lives of civilians in the city, where the population ran from
200,000 to 250,000. It is likely that the civilian death toll would
have been higher had this safe haven not been created. Rabe and
American missionary Lewis S. C. Smythe, the secretary of the
International Committee, who was also a professor of sociology
at the University of Nanjing, recorded atrocities of the Japanese
troops and filed reports of complaints to the Japanese embassy. Rape
- Thirty girls were taken from the language school last night, and
today I have heard scores of heartbreaking stories of girls who were
taken from their homes last night—one of the girls was but 12 years
old…. Tonight a truck passed in which there were eight or ten girls,
and as it passed they called out "Jiu ming! Jiu ming!" (—save our
lives). (Minnie Vautrin's diary, December 16, 1937)
- It is a horrible story to relate; I know not where to begin nor
to end. Never have I heard or read of such brutality. Rape: We estimate
at least 1,000 cases a night and many by day. In case of resistance or
anything that seems like disapproval there is a bayonet stab or a
bullet. (James McCallum, letter to his family, December 19, 1937)
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East stated that
20,000 (and perhaps up to 80,000) women were raped—their ages ranging
from infants to the elderly (as old as 80). Rapes were often performed
in public during the day, sometimes in front of spouses or family
members. A large number of them were systematized in a process where
soldiers would search door-to-door for young girls, with many women
taken captive and gang raped. The women were then killed immediately
after the rape, often by mutilation. According to some testimonies,
other women were forced into military prostitution as comfort women. There are even stories of Japanese troops
forcing families to commit acts of incest.
Sons were forced to rape their mothers, fathers were forced to rape
daughters. One pregnant woman who was gang-raped by Japanese soldiers
gave birth only a few hours later; the baby was perfectly healthy. Monks who had
declared a life of celibacy were forced to rape women for the amusement of the Japanese
Chinese men were forced to have sex with corpses. Any resistance would
be met with summary executions. While the rape peaked immediately
following the fall of the city, it continued for the duration of the
Japanese occupation. Murder
Massacred Chinese civilians at Hsuchow
Various foreign residents in Nanjing at the time recorded their experiences with what was going on in the city:
Robert Wilson in his letter to his family: The slaughter of
civilians is appalling. I could go on for pages telling of cases of
rape and brutality almost beyond belief. Two bayoneted corpses are the
only survivors of seven street cleaners who were sitting in their
headquarters when Japanese soldiers came in without warning or reason
and killed five of their number and wounded the two that found their
way to the hospital.
John Magee in his letter to his wife: They not only killed
every prisoner they could find but also a vast number of ordinary
citizens of all ages…. Just the day before yesterday we saw a poor
wretch killed very near the house where we are living.
Robert Wilson in another letter to his family: They [Japanese
soldiers] bayoneted one little boy, killing him, and I spent an hour
and a half this morning patching up another little boy of eight who had
five bayonet wounds including one that penetrated his stomach, a
portion of omentum was outside the abdomen.
Immediately after the fall of the city, Japanese troops embarked
on a determined search for former soldiers, in which thousands of young
men were captured. Many were taken to the Yangtze River, where they were machine-gunned so their bodies would be carried down to Shanghai. Others were reportedly used for live bayonet practice. Decapitation
was a popular method of killing, while more drastic practices included
burning, nailing to trees, live burial, and hanging by the tongue. Some
people were beaten to death. The Japanese also summarily executed many
pedestrians on the streets, usually under the pretext that they might
be soldiers disguised in civilian clothing. Thousands were led away and mass-executed in an excavation known
as the "Ten-Thousand-Corpse Ditch," a trench measuring about 300m long
and 5m wide. Since records were not kept, estimates regarding the
number of victims buried in the ditch range from 4,000 to 20,000.
However, most scholars and historians consider the number to be around
12,000 victims. Women and children were not spared from the horrors of the
massacres. Oftentimes, Japanese soldiers cut off the breasts,
disemboweled them, or in the case of pregnant women, cut open the
uterus and removed the fetus. Witnesses recall Japanese soldiers
throwing babies into the air and catching them with their bayonets.
Pregnant women were often the target of murder, as they would often be
bayoneted in the belly, sometimes after rape.
Many women were first brutally raped then killed. The actual scene of
this massacre is introduced in detail in the documentary film of the
movie "The Battle of China."
The Konoe government was well aware of the atrocities. On January
17, Foreign minister Koki Hirota received a telegram written by Manchester Guardian correspondant H. J. Timperley intercepted by the occupation government in Shanghai. In this telegram, Timperley wrote:
"Since return (to) Shanghai (a) few days ago I investigated
reported atrocities committed by Japanese Army in Nanjing and
elsewhere. Verbal accounts (of) reliable eye-witnesses and letters from
individuals whose credibility (is) beyond question afford convincing
proof (that) Japanese Army behaved and (is) continuing (to) behave in
(a) fashion reminiscent (of) Attila (and) his Huns. (Not) less than
three hundred thousand Chinese civilians slaughtered, many cases (in)
cold blood."
Manchester
Guardian correspondent H. J. Timperley wrote this telegram, which was
stopped by Japanese censors in Shanghai and was forwarded to the
Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. on January 17, 1938, by Japanese
foreign minister Kōki Hirota, where the transmission was intercepted
and decoded by the Americans.
Theft and arson
It is estimated that as much as two-thirds of the city was
destroyed as a result of arson. According to reports, Japanese troops
torched newly-built government buildings as well as the homes of many
civilians. There was considerable destruction to areas outside the city
walls. Soldiers pillaged from the poor and the wealthy alike. The lack
of resistance from Chinese troops and civilians in Nanjing meant that
the Japanese soldiers were free to "divvy up" the city's valuables as
they saw fit. This resulted in the widespread looting and burglary.
General Matsui Iwane was given an art collection worth $2,000,000 that
was stolen from a Shanghai banker.
Death toll estimates
There is great debate as to the extent of the war atrocities in
Nanjing, especially regarding estimates of the death toll. The issues
involved in calculating the number of victims are largely based on the
debatees' definitions of the geographical range and the duration of the
event, as well as their definition of the "victims."
Range and duration
The most conservative viewpoint is that the geographical area of
the incident should be limited to the few square kilometers of the city
known as the Safety Zone, where the civilians gathered after the
invasion. Many Japanese historians seized upon the fact that during the
Japanese invasion there were only 200,000–250,000 citizens in Nanjing
as reported by John Rabe, to argue that the PRC's estimate of 300,000
deaths is a vast exaggeration.
However, many historians include a much larger area around the
city. Including the Xiaguan district (the suburbs north of Nanjing
city, about 31 square km in size) and other areas on the outskirts of
the city, the population of greater Nanjing was running between 535,000
and 635,000 just prior to the Japanese occupation. Some historians also include six counties around Nanjing, known as the Nanjing Special Municipality.
The duration of the incident is naturally defined by its
geography: the earlier the Japanese entered the area, the longer the
duration. The Battle of Nanjing ended on December 13, when the
divisions of the Japanese Army entered the walled city of Nanjing. The
Tokyo War Crime Tribunal defined the period of the massacre to the
ensuing six weeks. More conservative estimates say the massacre started
on December 14, when the troops entered the Safety Zone, and that it
lasted for six weeks. Historians who define the Nanjing Massacre as
having started from the time the Japanese Army entered Jiangsu
province push the beginning of the massacre to around mid-November to
early December (Suzhou fell on November 19), and stretch the end of the
massacre to late March 1938. Naturally, the number of victims proposed
by these historians is much greater than more conservative estimates. Various estimates
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East estimated in
two (seemingly conflicting) reports that "over 200,000" and "over
100,000" civilians and prisoners of war
were murdered during the first six weeks of the occupation. That number
was based on burial records submitted by charitable
organizations—including the Red Swastika Society and the Chung Shan
Tang (Tsung Shan Tong)—the research done by Smythe, and some estimates
given by survivors. In 1947, at the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal, the verdict for
Lieutenant General Hisao Tani—the commander of the Sixth
Division—quoted a figure of more than 300,000 dead. This estimate was
made from burial records and eyewitness accounts. It concluded that
some 190,000 were illegally executed at various execution sites and
150,000 were killed one-by-one. The death toll of 300,000 is the
official estimate engraved on the stone wall at the entrance of the
"Memorial Hall for Compatriot Victims of the Japanese Military's
Nanking Massacre" in Nanjing.
Some modern Japanese historians, such as Kasahara Tokushi of Tsuru
University and Fujiwara Akira, a professor emeritus at Hitotsubashi
University, take into account the entire Nanjing Special Municipality,
which consisted of the walled city and its neighboring six counties,
and have come up with an estimate of approximately 200,000 dead. Other
Japanese historians, depending on their definition of the geographical
and time duration of the killings, place the death toll on a much wider
scale from 40,000 to 300,000. In China today most estimates of the
Nanjing Massacre range from 200,000 to 400,000, with no notable
historian going below 100,000.
A 42-part ROC documentary produced in 1995, entitled "An Inch of Blood For An Inch of Land"
asserts that 340,000 Chinese civilians died in Nanjing City as a result
of the Japanese invasion, 150,000 through bombing and crossfire in the
five-day battle, and 190,000 in the massacre, based on the evidence
presented at the Tokyo Trials.
The judgments (Tokyo trial)
Among the evidence presented at the Tokyo trial was the "Magee
film," documentary footage included in the American movie "The Battle
of China," as well as the oral and written testimonies of people
residing in the international zone.
Following evidence of mass atrocities, General Iwane Matsui was
judged for "crimes against humanity" and, in 1948, sentenced to death
by the Tokyo tribunal. Matsui went out of his way to protect Prince
Asaka by shifting blame to lower ranking division commanders. Generals
Hisao Tani and Rensuke Isogai were sentenced to death by the Nanking
tribunal.
In accord with the policy of Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
Emperor Hirohoto himself and all the members of the imperial family
were not prosecuted. Prince Asaka, who was the ranking officer in the
city at the height of the atrocities, made only a deposition to the
International Prosecution Section of the Tokyo tribunal on May 1, 1946.
Asaka denied any massacre of Chinese and claimed never to have received
complaints about the conduct of his troops. Historiography and debate
At present, both China and Japan
have acknowledged the occurrence of wartime atrocities. However,
disputes over the historical portrayal of these events have been at the
root of continuing political tensions between China and Japan. The widespread atrocities committed by the Japanese in Nanjing
were first reported to the world by the Westerners residing in the
Nanjing Safety Zone. For instance, on January 11, 1938, a correspondent
for the Manchester Guardian, Harold Timperley, tried to cable
his estimate of "not less than 300,000 Chinese civilians" killed in
cold blood in "Nanjing and elsewhere." His message was relayed from
Shanghai to Tokyo
by Kōki Hirota, to be sent out to the Japanese embassies in Europe and
the United States. Dramatic reports of Japanese brutality against
Chinese civilians by American journalists, as well as the Panay
incident, which occurred just before the occupation of Nanjing, helped
turn American public opinion against Japan. These, in part, led to a
series of events which culminated in the American declaration of war on
Japan after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Two
Japanese officers, Toshiaki Mukai and Tsuyoshi Noda competing to see
who could kill (with a sword) one hundred people first. The bold
headline reads, "'Incredible Record' (in the Contest to) Cut Down 100
People—Mukai 106 – 105 Noda—Both 2nd Lieutenants Go Into Extra Innings"
Post-1972 Japanese interest
Interest in the Nanjing Massacre waned into near obscurity until
1972, the year China and Japan normalized diplomatic relationships. In
China, to foster the newly found friendship with Japan, the People's
Republic of China under Mao Zedong ostensibly suppressed the mention of
the Nanjing Massacre from public discourse and the media, which the
Communist Party directly controlled. Therefore, the entire debate on
the Nanjing Massacre during the 1970s took place in Japan. In
commemoration of the normalization, one major Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, ran a series of articles entitled "Travels in China" (中国の旅, chūgoku no ta),
written by journalist Katsuichi Honda. The articles detailed the
atrocities of the Japanese Army within China, including the Nanjing
Massacre. In the series, Honda mentioned an episode in which two
officers competed to slay 100 people with their swords. The truth of
this incident is hotly disputed and critics seized on the opportunity
to imply that the episode, as well as the Nanjing Massacre and all its
accompanying articles, were largely falsified. This is regarded as the
start of the Nanjing Massacre controversy in Japan.
The debate concerning the actual occurrence of killings and
rapes took place mainly in the 1970s. The Chinese government's
statements about the event came under attack during this time, because
they were said to rely too heavily on personal testimonies and
anecdotal evidence. Also coming under attack were the burial records
and photographs presented in the Tokyo War Crime Court, which were said
to be fabrications by the Chinese government, artificially manipulated
or incorrectly attributed to the Nanjing Massacre.
On the other hand, recent excavation activities and efforts at
historical re-evaluation have suggested that the original casualties
may have been underestimated largely due to the fact that the large
number of refugees fleeing from other provinces and killed in Nanjing
was uncertain until recently.
The Japanese distributor of the film The Last Emperor (1987) edited out the stock footage of the Rape of Nanking from the film.
The Ienaga textbook incident
Controversy flared up again in 1982, when the Japanese Ministry of Education censored
any mention of the Nanjing Massacre in a high school textbook. The
reason given by the ministry was that the Nanjing Massacre was not a
well-established historical event. The author of the textbook,
Professor Saburō Ienaga, sued the Ministry of Education in an extended
case, which was won by the plaintiff in 1997. A number of Japanese cabinet ministers, as well as some
high-ranking politicians, have also made comments denying the
atrocities committed by the Japanese Army in World War II. Some
subsequently resigned after protests from China and South Korea.
In response to these and similar incidents, a number of Japanese
journalists and historians formed the Nankin Jiken Chōsa Kenkyūkai (Nanjing Incident Research Group).
The research group has collected large quantities of archival materials
as well as testimonies from both Chinese and Japanese sources.
The more hardline members of the government cabinet feel that the
extent of crimes committed has been exaggerated as a pretext to surging
Chinese nationalism. Such conservative forces have been accused of
gradually reducing the number of casualties by manipulating data.
"Underground Great Wall":
site of Ranzhuang Tunnel Warfare
PLA Daily 2005-07-18
In the vast plains stretching for hundreds of miles in the Central
Hebei Province there is a famous battlefield, which made the Japanese
invaders become panic-stricken whenever they heard its name. It is the
tunnel warfare battlefield at Ranzhuang Village of Qingyuan County,
Hebei Province.
After Japanese aggressors occupied the Central Hebei in 1938, local
people of Ranzhuang Village started to resist against Japanese
aggressors under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. In the
beginning, villagers in Ranzhuang dug single-entrance underground caves
only for sheltering themselves and hiding their belongings when
Japanese troops came to loot the village. Later, the single-entrance
caves were changed into double-entrance ones and extended farther with
more entrances, and finally formed a 15 km tunnel network, in which all
the households in the village were connected and many villages around
Ranzhuang were linked.
Tunnels with a total length of 1,600 meters at the site of the Tunnel
Warfare in Ranzhuang are open to the public now. The local government
dredged and renovated the tunnels to reproduce their original
appearance. When walking in the 0.8-meter-wide, one-meter-high tunnel,
the reporter felt as if walking in a mysterious underground labyrinth.
One could hardly tell the direction even in weak lights. When walking
in the tunnel, the most astonishing thing is the intelligence and
wisdom the people of Ranzhuang displayed in building the tunnel.
The
tunnels were connected with millstones, land fortress, defense works in
high buildings and temples. In addition, there were also commanding
room, road signs, traps, kitchens, toilets and bunkers in the tunnels,
and the entrances of the tunnels were ingeniously camouflaged by walls,
grounds, livestock sheds, kitchen ranges and heated kangs.
Statistics show that during the War of Resistance Against Japanese
Aggression, a total of 2,100 Japanese troops were killed in the tunnel
warfare in Ranzhuang. During each mopping-up operation, Japanese
invaders would leave dozens of corpses in Ranzhuang and bugged out in
panic. There was a pet phrase popular in Japanese troops: "We'd rather
take the long way from Heifengkou than pass through Ranzhuang.
The Site of the Tunnel Warfare is in Ranzhuang Village in Qingyuan County of
Hebei Province. It is 30 kilometers away from Baoding City in Hebei
Province. There is the Memorial for the Tunnel Warfare in Ranzhuang
Village.
The Tunnel in Ranzhuang Village is 15 kilometers long in
total, with the crossroad in the village as the center. It has four
main stems to the east, west, south and north, with 11 lateral lines
from east to west and 13 lateral lines from south to north. Besides,
there are tunnels connecting other villages and four tunnels out of the
village. Thus a tunnel net had come into being for the communication
between villages. With this tunnel system people could either attack
the enemy or protect themselves.
The tunnels are 0.7-0.8 meters wide, 1.0-1.5 meters high on the average. The top  of
the tunnels is about 2 meters from the ground. There are two kinds,
with one as the hiding place for the masses and the other as the
battling tunnel used by the army. The structure of the tunnels is very
complicated. There are a variety of installations such as the
headquarters, the kitchen, the dining room, the retiring room, the
grain storeroom, the secrets room, and the water closet, etc. There is
also the anti-gas equipment and traps. The exits of the tunnels are
generally fixed at the ulterior places such as a cooking stove, a
grind, a trough for the livestock, a bellow and the mouth of a well.
The tunnels are connected to the wells to get air and water. The battle
fortifications include the ground fortress, the shooting holes, the
works on the roofs, and the works built at the small temples, the grind
stand, the counter, the corners and foot of the walls, the darkroom,
etc, which are connected with the tunnels. Moreover, there are hidden
shooting holes in the walls along the avenues and lanes. Thus, a mighty
covert battle net took shape, which helped people win over the
unprepared enemy.
In 1937, Japanese troops invaded China's
northern plains. In their war of resistance to Japanese aggression the
people of Ranzhuang village in Qingyuan County, Hebei Province, dug an
amazing 16 kilometers of tunnels under the local Communist Party. The
system with its 4 main and 24 subsidiary tunnels connected every house
in the village and allowed the defenders to conceal themselves,
redeploy in secret and fire at the enemy from cover. The tunnel site
has been preserved as it was back in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1961 the
State Council listed the tunnels as a key historical heritage site.
(Photo Source: baidu.com)
The Site of the Tunnel
Warfare is in Ranzhuang Village in Qingyuan County of Hebei Province.
It is 30 kilometers away from Baoding City in Hebei Province. There is
the Memorial for the Tunnel Warfare in Ranzhuang Village.
The
Tunnel in Ranzhuang Village is 15 kilometers long in total, with the
crossroad in the village as the center. It has four main stems to the
east, west, south and north, with 11 lateral lines from east to west
and 13 lateral lines from south to north. Besides, there are tunnels
connecting other villages and four tunnels out of the village. Thus a
tunnel net had come into being for the communication between villages.
With this tunnel system people could either attack the enemy or protect
themselves.
The
tunnels are 0.7-0.8 meters wide, 1.0-1.5 meters high on the average.
The top of the tunnels is about 2 meters from the ground. There are two
kinds, with one as the hiding place for the masses and the other as the
battling tunnel used by the army. The structure of the tunnels is very
complicated. There are a variety of installations such as the
headquarters, the kitchen, the dining room, the retiring room, the
grain storeroom, the secrets room, and the water closet, etc. There is
also the anti-gas equipment and traps. The exits of the tunnels are
generally fixed at the ulterior places such as a cooking stove, a
grind, a trough for the livestock, a bellow and the mouth of a well.
The tunnels are connected to the wells to get air and water. The
battle fortifications include the ground fortress, the shooting holes,
the works on the roofs, and the works built at the small temples, the
grind stand, the counter, the corners and foot of the walls, the
darkroom, etc, which are connected with the tunnels. Moreover, there
are hidden shooting holes in the walls along the avenues and lanes.
Thus, a mighty covert battle net took shape, which helped people win
over the unprepared enemy.
In
the periods of the Anti-Japanese War and the Liberation War, the people
in Ranzhuang Village developed the Tunnel Warfare under the direction
of the Communist Party. They dealt heavy blows to the enemies in more
than 150 battles. Because of their great achievements, the village was
honored as the Model Village Resisting the Japanese Invaders.
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